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Abstract. Did British colonial policy primarily benefit Britain, or its colonies? Wadan 
Narsey, in British Imperialism and the Makings of Colonial Currency Systems 
(2016),claims that Britain established currency boards to help itself at the expense of the 
colonies. Examining the history of several currency boards and their assets for select years, 
Narsey finds that under British influence, they held lower-yielding, shorter-maturity British 
assets than they need have done, costing colonial governments revenue. We explore this 
idea by analyzing full annual data on the securities and assets of the currency boards of 
Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa. An accompanying spreadsheet workbook shows 
the details of the analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
s part of its imperial expansion in the 19th and 20th centuries, Great Britain 
set up currency board systems in many of its colonies. Establishing boards 
in colonies such as Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa, Britain sought 
monetary control over its colonies. Observers have questioned whether Britain 
organized the boards for its own good or for the development of its colonies. In his 
book British Imperialism and the Makings of Colonial Currency Systems (2016), 
Wadan Narsey cites changes in asset and security composition as proof that the 
boards benefited Britain at the expense of the colonies. Narsey categorizes the idea 
that the boards held securities in London ‚in order to maximize the income from… 
currency reserves, with complete safety‛ as a general misconception (Narsey 2016: 
17). Rather, in his view, the securities served to ease Britain’s balance of payments, 
finance British investment, and give Britain great authority over colonial finances. 
He describes a pattern whereby British colonial currency boards shifted their assets 
from higher-yielding, longer-maturity securities, often issued by other British 
colonies, into lower-yielding, shorter-maturity British government securities 
(Narsey 2016: 18). As a result, colonial governments received less revenue from 
the currency boards than they could have with a portfolio composition that could 
still preserve the fixed exchange rates of colonial currencies to the pound sterling. 
Narsey points out that the London money market underwent several crises 
between 1890 and 1912, the period during which British officials established the 
template for colonial currency boards. The crises ‚had a central bearing on colonial 
currency policies… (in terms of) their holdings of undesirable British Government 
securities‛ (Narsey 2016: 158). In his discussion of academic writings on currency 
boards, Narsey concludes that ‚the evidence of our study supports that... while 
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mercantilism was concealed or disguised in the nineteenth century, it had continued 
well into the twentieth century‛ (Narsey 2016: 209). 
Narsey offers documentary evidence from unpublished government 
correspondence in Britain’s Public Record Office (now the National Archives). He 
also shows the asset composition of several currency boards for select years. To 
make a more thorough test of the figures he calculates, this paper examinesfull 
annual data on the assets of the Palestine Currency Board, East African Currency 
Board, and West African Currency Board. They were among the largest British 
colonial currency boards, so their asset holdings were of particular importance for 
British policy regarding the ‚sterling area‛—the colonies and independent 
countries that tied their currencies to the pound sterling, and that for most of the 
period from 1914 to 1972 had a common set of exchange controls against third 
currencies. 
 
2. Methods 
To test Narsey’s claim, we first digitized the securities data from each currency 
board’s annual report. Then, we classified each security into one of four categories: 
British Empire (other British colonies, mandates, and dominions), British national 
(British war loans, treasury bonds, etc.), British subnational (counties or cities in 
England, British government-owned or government-guaranteed companies, etc.), 
and domestic (securities issued in colonies belonging to the currency board—for 
example, the East African Currency Board holding a Ugandan government or 
private security). The East and West African boards held domestic securities, while 
the Palestine Currency Board did not.  
We copied the assets for each currency board from the digitized balance sheets 
published by Krus & Schuler (2014). Krus and Schuler digitized other balance 
sheet data, but not the details of securities holdings. We then analyzed the security 
and asset composition. For security composition, we used the four aforementioned 
categories. For overall asset composition, we used those four categories along with 
four other categories: deposits at banks, the Crown Agents,1 etc.; British treasury 
bills; coin;2 and other assets.3 
We thenassessed the maturity and interest rate of the portfolio using two 
different methods. First, we calculated the average unweighted interest and 
maturity for different securities and classifications every year. Note that in some 
years, boards may not have held any securities of a certain security classification, 
so not all lines in our ‚by classification‛ charts span all years. Next, we calculated 
averages weighted by the amount of each security or asset held. The two methods 
show broadly similar results, so the graphs below show only the unweighted 
figures. 4  Some securities were callable, meaning that the issuer promised 
redemption at a specified date but had the option redeeming them at an earlier date. 
We calculated the portfolio using both the earlier and later redemption dates. The 
graphs below show only the calculations using the later dates, which do not 
appreciably change our conclusions.  
Because the overall portfolio of the currency boards determined the risk and 
return of their assets, the graphs focus on total assets, not just holdings of 
securities. We looked at assets both in terms of percentage of total assets and in 
 
1 The Crown Agents for the Colonies were a British government agency that offered fee-based 
financial management and other services to the colonies. Colonial governments were free to use 
private providers instead. 
2 We did not include every type of coin; we looked at coin in store at cost price and market value of 
coin in stock. 
3 For East Africa and West Africa, we added a domestic assets category in addition to the domestic 
securities category. 
4 Asset maturity for assets of zero or near-zero maturity, such as demand deposits, was weighted at 
0.01 years. Securities with no explicit maturity, notably British consols, were assigned a maturity of 
100.5 years – the .5 indicates that an assumption was made. 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(4), T. Boger, p.296-308. 
298 
terms of pounds, so as to contextualize the asset values (for example, British 
Empire securities made up most of the East African Currency Board’s portfolio in 
some years, but in those years the overall portfolio value was small). 
An accompanying spreadsheet workbook contains calculations of the securities 
portfolios alone, other calculations omitted from the graphs, and further data that 
will be of interest to readers who wish to explore the details behind our 
conclusions. 
The charts included in the accompanying spreadsheets, but not in this paper are: 
weighted average interest and maturity, security composition (%), security 
composition (pounds), and average maturity by classification (unweighted). 
 
3. Palestine currency board: Background5 
Let us now consider each currency board in turn, starting with Palestine. During 
World War I, British forces conquered Palestine from the Ottoman Empire. In 1922 
the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate over Palestine (now Israel and the 
Gaza Strip) and neighboring Transjordan (now Jordan). Under the League’s rules, 
the country which was granted a mandate promised to develop it for the benefit of 
its inhabitants and not to annex the territory. 
The conquering British forces had come from Egypt -which at the time was a 
British protectorate- and had brought Egyptian currency with them to use in 
payments. Egyptian currency displaced Ottoman currency.6 The seignior age (profit 
from issuing the currency) accrued to the note-issuing National Bank of Egypt -a 
privately owned commercial and central bank whose shareholders were British, 
French, and Egyptian- and to the Egyptian government, which issued the coins 
used in Palestine and Transjordan.  
To enable the seignior age to accrue to the governments of Palestine and 
Transjordan, the British government founded the Palestine Currency Board on 15 
June 1926. The board began issuing currency on 1 November 1927. Its currency 
was the Palestine pound, equal to the pound sterling, although subdivided into 
1,000 mils instead of into 20 shillings or 240 pence like sterling. The board issued 
both notes and coins. 
The initial members of the currency board were three Britons:  P.H. Ezechiel, a 
Crown Agent for the Colonies; Leslie Couper, General Manager of the Bank of 
British West Africa; and A.J. Harding of the Colonial Office. The board was based 
in London. 
The Palestine Currency Board’s first annual report described its investment 
policy in these terms: ‚The Board may invest its funds in securities of the 
Government of any part of His Majesty’s Dominions or in such other manner as the 
Secretary of State may approve. The extent to which investments may be made will 
be left to the discretion of the Board, whose duty it will be to hold, subject to any 
discretions which may be received from the Secretary of State, a proportion of its 
reserve in a liquid form‛ (Palestine Currency Board Annual Report 1928: 7). 
Observe that the board was not required by law to hold only external assets; the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies allowed it to hold domestic assets. However, in 
practice the board had no such holdings other than for petty cash for transitory 
purposes. 
The Palestine Currency Board functioned without incident until 1947. In that 
year the proposed United Nations partition of Palestine into Arab and Israeli states 
led to a civil war when Arab leaders refused to accept the partition. Both the 
partition plan and the war raised the possibility that the new state(s) might not want 
to continue to be subject to a currency board controlled by the British government.  
 
5 Background information for all three currency boards is from either the Johns Hopkins University 
Digital Archive on Currency Boards or Krus & Schuler (2014). 
6 The Ottomans ruled Palestine from 1517 to 1917. 
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Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948 and began issuing its own 
currency on 17 August 1948 through the Anglo Palestine Bank, its largest local 
financial institution. The Palestine Currency Board continued to serve the West 
Bank, which had been absorbed by Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the 
Gaza Strip, which was administered by Egypt. Jordan began issuing a separate 
currency to replace the Palestine pound under its own currency board on 1 July 
1950. Egyptian currency replaced the Palestine pound in the Gaza Strip beginning 
in April 1951. Currency redemption ended on 9 June 1951, when the Palestine 
pound was declared no longer legal tender there. It ceased to be legal tender in 
Jordan on 30 June 1951. The board was liquidated on 17 June 1952. 
Palestine currency board: Portfolio analysis 
For Palestine, our results prove Narsey’s claim correct. Over time, the currency 
board moved its portfolio into lower-yielding, shorter-maturity securities, which 
aligned with British interests. The graph below shows the unweighted average 
interest and years to average maturity each year. Aside from the years around 1936, 
the average interest decreased almost each year. 
 
 
Figure 1.  PCB average interest and maturity 
 
In the graph on the next page, notice that the interest rate of British national 
securities (orange line)decreased consistently. British subnational securities’ 
average interest rate (grey line) fluctuated; this is the result of using an unweighted 
average. The board did not hold many subnational securities, so each new 
subnational security affected the classification’s average interest significantly. 
Overall, the portfolio held many British national securities compared to Empire and 
subnational securities, giving the British national securities’ average interest rate 
more statistical significance. The graph below shows the interest rates for each 
security class. 
 
 
Figure 2. Palestine currency borad average interest by classification (%) 
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The asset composition shows the large holding of assets for British benefit. 
Deposits at banks, Crown Agents, etc. made up most of the assets until the 
liquidation phase; at that point, the board held a large portion of its assets in British 
treasury bills. In terms of securities, British national securities composed mostof 
the portfolio each year. The graph below shows the board’s assets as a percentage 
of total assets. 
 
 
Figure 3. Palestine currency board asset allocation (%) 
 
The graph below plots the same data in pounds to contextualize the assets in 
terms of total value. Notice that each year that the board maintained a large 
portfolio, it was overwhelmingly composed of British national securities, deposits, 
and British treasury bills. 
 
 
Figure 4. Palestine currency board asset allocation (%) 
 
Our interest and maturity data support Narsey’s hypothesis. The board 
increasingly held lower-interest, shorter-maturity securities over time. With its 
securities almost completely made up of British national securities, and its assets 
mostly composed of deposits and British treasury bills— both short-term securities 
for Britain —we conclude that the board’s portfolio benefited Britain at some cost 
to Palestine and Transjordan. 
 
4. East African currency board: Background 
During World War I, British forces conquered Tanganyika from the Germans. 
At the time, Kenya and Uganda were British colonies, and Zanzibar was a British 
protectorate. Kenya and Zanzibar had local currency boards, which only issued 
notes, not coins. Kenyan notes circulated to some extent in Uganda. Britain 
established a currency board to unify currency in its East African colonies and to 
enable Uganda and Tanganyika to share in the profits of issue. 
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The British government established the East African Currency Board as a legal 
body in December 1919. There is some question over when the board began 
issuing currency. Although it may have done so by about 22 May 1920, it is certain 
that it did so by 31 July 1920, when it took over the assets and liabilities of the 
Kenyan currency board. The official currency, the East African shilling, was equal 
to the British shilling at a 1:1 rate. However, there was also an informal yet widely 
used unit, the East African pound – 20 East African shillings equaled 1 East 
African pound, making the East African pound equal to the pound sterling. The 
East African shilling was a decimal currency divided into 100 cents. 
Up until 1961, the board was headquartered in London. So, the securities data in 
the balance sheet were expressed in British pounds, shillings (20 per pound), and 
pence (240 per pound). However, on 22 August 1960, the board moved its 
headquarters to Nairobi, Kenya. Starting in 1962, the securities data were reported 
in East African currency, so the securities data were divided into cents. 
The member countries of the board on the date of its establishment were Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika. In 1936, Zanzibar joined, ending its separate currency 
board. After World War II, the board further expanded, with Aden (later part of 
Southern Yemen, and now part of Yemen) and British Somaliland (now northern 
Somalia) joining.7 
The initial governing members of the currency board were all Britons: W.H. 
Mercer, Senior Crown Agent for the Colonies; W.C. Bottomley, of the Colonial 
Office; and P.H. Ezechiel, Secretary to the Crown Agents).  
The first annual report for the currency board uses the same terms later used for 
the Palestine Currency Board to outline its investment policy: ‚Subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 20 of these Regulations, the Board may invest their funds 
in securities of the Government of any part of His Majesty’s dominions or in such 
other manner as the Secretary of State may approve‛ (East African Currency Board 
Annual Report 1920-1921: 8). No law required the board to hold only British 
assets. Although the board did end up holding domestic securities and assets, their 
value was negligible compared to that of the British assets. 
On 10 April 1969, the board ceased issuing currency. It was liquidated and its 
notes were demonetized on 31 December 1972. The board had ceased being the 
monetary authority of its member countries earlier, as the member countries had 
established their own central banks and become independent. British Somaliland 
gained independence on 26 June 1960 as part of Somalia; Tanganyika became 
independent on 9 December 1961; Uganda became independent in 1962; Kenya 
attained independence on 12 December 1963; Zanzibar gained independence in 
1963; and Aden attained independence on 30 November. 
East African Currency Board: Portfolio Analysis 
For East Africa, we reached similar conclusions as those for Palestine. The 
maturity and interest of the portfolio declined over time, and the board’s assets and 
securities were invested such that they would benefit Britain. The first chart on the 
following page shows the average interest and years from average maturity for East 
Africa. Although the interest rose in the final years of the board, this was caused by 
holding more domestic issues (not British securities) and very short-term, high-
interest British national securities. 
 
 
7 The East African Currency Board held securities issued by both Aden and Zanzibar after they 
became members of the board, so these securities are defined under our ‚domestic‛ classification. 
During World War II and for some time after the board also issued currency in Italian colonies in 
the region that were conquered by British forces. 
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Figure 5. EACB average interest and maturity 
 
The average interest rates on British Empire securities increased over time, 
while rates on British subnational and domestic securities remained relatively 
stable. The average interest of British national securities decreased until the board 
began holding high-interest conversion loans and treasury bonds. The chart below 
shows average interest rates by classification. 
 
 
Figure 6. East Africa currency board average interest by classification (%) 
 
In the first years of the board, most of the board’s overall assets were in coin 
and other assets. 8  However, once the portfolio normalized, British national 
securities took over as the largest security class, and there was a large increase in 
deposits at banks, Crown Agents, etc. Near the decolonization dates of Tanganyika, 
Kenya, and Uganda, there was a sizable increase in British treasury bills. After the 
decolonization (essentially meaning that the board entered a liquidation phase)9 the 
board maintained a large portion of its assets in deposits. The graph below shows 
the asset composition as a percentage of total assets.10 
 
 
8 Other assets in this period are mostly Indian coin and the balance of silver coinage profit and loss 
account. 
9 We describe this period after decolonization as the liquidation phase because after decolonization, 
most member countries established central banks. Also, the final year of securities data was 1966 (5 
years after the first decolonization date). 
10 The white space at the top between 1931 and 1933 is due to the fact that the percentage of other 
assets was negative. During those years, the board held a large portion of its assets in coin; the coin 
and the total securities alone equaled more than the total assets, giving us a negative value for other 
assets. 
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Figure 7. East Africa currency board asset allocation (%) 
 
Like Palestine, during the period when the board managed a large portfolio, the 
portfolio was mostly composed of assets and securities for British benefit. Most 
notably, there were large holdings of British national securities, British treasury 
bills, and deposits. Both deposits and British treasury bills are short-term, low-
interest assets. 
Narsey further tests this claim; per his calculations, investments in the United 
Kingdom (excluding deposits and treasury bills) composed only 23 percent of 
securities in 1921. However, from 1946 on, they composed 99 percent of the 
portfolio (Narsey 2016: 277). The first graph on the following page shows the asset 
composition in shillings. 
 
 
Figure 8. East Africa currency board asset allocation (£) 
 
Our data for the East African Currency Board support Narsey’s claim. Indeed, 
the average maturity and interest of the portfolio decreased over time (although, as 
discussed, the interest rate did rise after 1956 because of high-interest, short-term 
securities). Our portfolio analysis shows that British national securities, deposits, 
and treasury bills made up most of the portfolio almost every year. Therefore, we 
view the East African Currency Board as having benefited Britain at some expense 
to East Africa. 
 
5. West African currency board: Background 
Unlike the Palestine and East African currency boards, the West African 
Currency Board was not established because of territorial gain in World War I. The 
British established a currency board so that they could provide a local currency for 
their colonies in West Africa. They worried that British silver coins, which were 
then used in West Africa but whose legal tender was limited to £2 in the United 
Kingdom, could cause financial embarrassment for the British government if a 
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large, sudden demand for their redemption arose in Africa. Separating West 
African currency from British currency was a way of quarantining demands for 
redemption so that they did not undermine the credibility of the pound sterling. 
The board was founded before World War I began. Members were appointed on 
21 November 1912, and weeks later, on 6 December 1912, the board was 
established. It began issuing currency on 26 June 1913. Its currency, the British 
West African pound, was equal to the pound sterling at a 1:1 rate. Like sterling, it 
was divided into shillings (20 per pound) and pence (240 per pound). 
Initially, the board covered Gambia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, and 
Sierra Leone. After World War I, Cameroons (now divided between Nigeria and 
Cameroon) and Togoland (now part of Ghana) became British mandates supervised 
by the League of Nations. Cameroons was administered as part of Nigeria, and 
Togoland as part of Ghana, so both used West African currency. Liberia also used 
West African currency, but it was not a member of the board and did not receive a 
share of the profits. 
The West African Currency Board was also headed by three Britons: G.V. 
Fiddes, from the Colonial Office; W.H. Mercer, Senior Crown Agent for the 
Colonies; and L. Couper, General Manager of the Bank of British West Africa. 
Further, the board was headquartered in London, and Mercer and Couper were later 
members of the East African Currency Board. 
The provisions governing investment were very general: ‚The Board will 
maintain in London against the silver coinage a reserve of gold and securities, 
hereafter referred to as the ‘gold standard reserve’‛ (West Africa Currency Board 
Annual Report 1914: 7). There were no guidelines stating that the board could not 
hold a certain type of security, or that it must hold British securities. 
In his exploration of the history of the West African Currency Board, Narsey 
also finds two other characteristics defining its investments: the local currency 
would be backed 110 percent by gold and sterling reserves in London, and 10 
percent of the currency reserves would be kept as a Depreciation Fund to guard 
against the depreciation of the sterling securities (Narsey 2016: 146). These terms 
seem overly strict to him, especially the requirement of keeping 10 percent of 
currency reserves in a depreciation fund. He adduces these condition as evidence 
that Britain leveraged the colonial currency to help the sterling and British 
securities. 
Because of the independence of the West African colonies, the board ceased 
issuing currency on 31 May 1968, and was fully liquidated on 31 October 
1973.The Gold Coast became independent on 6 March 1957; Nigeria became 
independent on 1 October 1960; Sierra Leone gained independence on 27 April 
1961; Gambia obtained independence on 18 February 1965. Each country 
established a national currency authority around the time of its independence. 
West African Currency Board: Portfolio Analysis 
For our third and final currency board, our results were similar to the other two. 
The board over time shifted its portfolio to shorter-maturity, lower-interest 
securities for British benefit. Like East Africa, West Africa’s average interest and 
maturity steadily declined until the final years of the board, at which point the 
interest rose dramatically.  
For West Africa, this rise in interest was mostly caused by high-interest 
Exchequer loans11 and treasury stock (all of which had over 6 percent interest), and 
British subnational securities. In 1969 there was a group of loans called the ‚local 
authority bonds,‛ composed of 11 subnational securities, with the lowest interest 
rate among them being 8.375 percent. The graph below shows the average interest 
and maturity. 
 
11 The Exchequer was the department of the British Treasury responsible for taxes and accounting. 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(4), T. Boger, p.296-308. 
305 
 
Figure 9.WACB average interest and maturity 
 
Examining the interest by classification helps explain the large rise in interest. 
Notice how after 1968, the average interest for British subnational securities is 
about 9 percent because of higher inflation. Also, in the middle of the 
decolonization phase, the average interest of British national securities begins to 
rise. The graph below shows the average interest by classification. 
 
 
Figure 10. West Africa currency board average interest by classification (%) 
 
After the first years of the board, during which other assets made up most of the 
portfolio, the highest-valued assets were British treasury bills and deposits at 
banks, Crown Agents, etc. Along with the British assets, most of the portfolio’s 
securities were British national. The graph below shows the asset composition as a 
percentage of total assets. 
 
 
Figure 11. West Africa currency board asset allocation (%) 
 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(4), T. Boger, p.296-308. 
306 
The asset composition in pounds further shows the large holding of these short-
term assets, especially British treasury bills. The graph below shows the asset 
composition in pounds. 
 
 
Figure 12. West Africa currency board asset allocation (£) 
 
Our analysis of West Africa’s currency board proves Narsey’s claim correct. 
Furthermore, West Africa’s currency board was a model to other British currency 
boards, so its shift of securities and assets for British benefit might well be seen in 
other boards too. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The results from our statistical analysis of three different British colonial 
currency boards (Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa) prove Wadan Narsey’s 
(2016) claim correct. Each board shifted its assets to lower-yielding, shorter-
maturity securities over time, which benefited Britain at some expense to the 
colonies. Even when the boards could invest in other securities, they continued to 
compose their portfolios and assets of British national securities and assets. 
Furthermore, initially no representatives from British colonies had a seat on the 
governing board; all three members on each board at its inception were in the 
British government. As such, we conclude that the policies of the currency boards 
enabled Britain to manipulate its colonies’ monetary systems for its own benefit. 
To examine the extent to which the portfolios benefitted Britain, we created a 
model portfolio. The model portfolio held 75 percent of its assets in Empire 
securities (we used Australian bonds for this), 15 percent national securities (10 
year British Treasury bills), and 10 percent deposits. We compared this to the 
weighted interest of the actual portfolio. Even with deposits weighing down on the 
model portfolio – while they were not included in the real one – both East and 
West Africa’s model portfolios outperformed their real portfolios. The graph below 
shows the difference in value of the model and real portfolios (with the initial year 
equal to £100 for both portfolios). 
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Figure 13. Currency board model portfolio vs. actual portfolio 
 
The portfolio policies of the currency boards this paper has examined were 
more concentrated in low-yielding British assets than they needed to be, benefiting 
Britain and reducing income for the currency boards and the colonial governments 
that belonged to them. As for the broader question of whether the monetary policy 
of the currency boards themselves was disadvantageous to the colonies, this is not 
the place to address it, but both a study by Schuler (1994) using simple statistical 
techniques, and a more sophisticated study by Wolf et al., (2008) indicate that 
currency board systems have tended to have less currency depreciation and lower 
average inflation rates than central banking system in emerging market countries. 
For instance, of the countries that belonged to the currency boards analyzed here, 
only one, Jordan, has a currency that has kept its value against the pound sterling; 
the Jordanian dinar is currently worth about £1.10. All the other currencies have 
depreciated against sterling by a factor of at least 10. In Nigeria, for instance, the 
factor of depreciation is about 230. In Israel it is more than 40,000, adjusting for 
the changes of currency since independence. 
Great Britain set up currency boards in colonies aside from Palestine, East 
Africa, and West Africa. These included major colonies such as Malaya, Iraq, 
Burma, and the British Caribbean, and many smaller colonies, such as British 
Honduras, Malta, and Zanzibar. These currency boards could also be tested using 
our methods to see if they, too, show a pattern of asset holdings that benefited 
Britain at the expense of the colonies. 
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